"A More Feminine Approach?" RethinkingHow America Deters a Nuclear-Capable Iran

Abstract: To demonstrate why a more feminist approach offers potentially greater success than the more masculine approaches already tried, and failed, this article provides aa case study of US deterrence strategy toward Iran during the most recent presidential administrationstwo Democratic and two Republican. Analysis will focus on whether each administration's stance toward Iran has been traditionally masculine, feminine, or a mix. From that examination, recommendations are made regarding development of effective US-Iranian deterrence strategy in the future.

Since the Islamic Republic was established in 1979, US-Iranian relations have deteriorated into acrimony, misperceptions, mutual distrust, and bitter exchanges. Iran's place in US grand strategy has depreciated from ally to terrorism producer and source of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As retired CIA officer Paul R. Pillar stated, "Each side's worst presumptions about the other side encourage words and actions that make the presumptions look true." One of the reasons the Biden administration changed the security narrative in 2021 from Great Power Competition to Strategic Competition was to factor Iran into what was otherwise considered a too China/Russia-centric worldview. While US presidential administrations have adopted a variety of foreign policy strategies toward Iran, certain key objectives have prevailed: the United States seeks to deter Iran from becoming a regional hegemon with nuclear power and wants to stop Tehran's support for what the United States deems terrorism. At the same time, while Iran has adopted at least two distinct foreign policy approaches since 1979—détente and then containment-it has also retained one common undercurrent. Iran seeks independence from foreign influence and does not want to be told what it can or cannot do by dominant world powers-particularly the United States and its allies-either by deterrence or compellence, two variations of coercion as a political-diplomatic strategy.

To understand coercion as a US strategic response to prevent military escalation with Iran, it is first important to consider the differences between deterrence and compellence. Deterrence seeks to prevent something from happening-to dissuade an opponent from a particular course of action because the costs/risks outweigh the benefits. Classical theories hold that deterrence "is the practice of discouraging or restraining someone—in world politics, usually a nation-state-from taking unwanted actions, such as an armed attack." Compellence, on the other hand, responds to an action already taken by an opponent. Compellence seeks to force an opponent to give up or stop doing something, to compel an opponent into a specific course of action. Because compellence "involves accepting a loss," while deterrence means "abstaining fromapossible gain," some argue that compellence is more difficult because it "induces risk-acceptant behavior."" Phrased differently, preventing a country from developing nuclear weapons is easier than convincing a country that already has them to give them up. This is particularly the case if the country in question is a rogue or pariah state that considers those weapons its primary guarantee of regime survival. Additionally, one must remember that both deterrence and compellence inherently include both a carrot and a stick. Numerous studies have found "strictly coercive or bullying strategies are not optimal under most conditions. For both deterrence and compellence to be effective, opponents must believe that they have something to gain, or less to lose, from actions.

As US hegemonic power wanes and US adversaries become significantly more capable, developing effective deterrence strategies becomes increasingly difficult. In addition, because deterrence must shape the thinking of a potential aggressor and therefore consider what it values and why, the ever-widening gap between US-Iranian perceptions and relations makes the chances of the United States adopting an effective deterrence policy with Iran more elusive. This is particularly the case if the United States continues to adopt what national security scholars Valerie Hudson and Rose McDermott deem traditional masculine deterrence strategies that come with, in their words, a significant price tag measured in strategic loss and human insecurity. Consequently, a successful long-term coercive strategy with Iran may require pursuance of a more feminine approach.

What Kind of Deterrencе?

Deterrence as Threat Based. The United States uses common strategies for stopping or preventing other states' actions: either deterrence by denial ox deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by denial strategies attempt to "deter an action by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives." Deterrence by punishment strategies threaten broader, more severe punishments that raise the cost of an attack. Generally, research holds that deterrence by denial strategies are more reliable, as deterrence by punishment strategies risk significant escalation-creating deeper tensions with rivals and possibly sparking the very conflicts they are intended to avoid. With regard to assuring the security of US space assets, for example, deterrence by denial has been increasingly emphasized due to the high potential of escalation through punishment strategies. Research shows that it is the subjective perceptions of the state being deterred that are the most important variable in whether deterrence by punishment succeeds or fails-for example, whether the state being deterred believes the deterring state has the will and capability to do what it threatens in the specific instance. Either way, both deterrence strategies focus on "dissuasion by means of threat ... threatening either the potential success or the other interests of the aggressor."

Deterrence as Masculine. Hudson and McDermott argue that traditional " US deterrence has a masculine bent, as it is "conceived in 'fight or flight' terms, with the fight portion involving “looking very fierce, weapons in hand, prepared to meet any challenge in order to deter potential adversaries from attacking" and post-deterrence resembling the 'flight' alternative. While "fight or flight" has been known as the universal physiological response to stress, psychologists now recognize the presence of gender bias in the original studies and that "fight or flight" is actually a predominately male behavior. When exposed to threat, during a "fight or flight" response, subjects size up the threat and attack only after confirming a realistic chance of overcoming it, versus fleeing if the threat is perceived to be more formidable. This predominately male biobehavioral response remains subjective and depends on the nature of the threat as perceived by the person threatened; one person's adrenal medulla might cause him to fight back during an attempted assault; another person's might trigger him to run away.

Fight or flight is different from what psychologists term a "tend and befriend" human stress response, which is recognized as a distinctly feminine physiological threat response. Utilizing tend and befriend, psychologists argue that, when facing threat, females nurture and tend to their offspring while reducing behaviors, such as fighting, that would jeopardize the safety of their offspring (tend) and affiliate with different social groups to reduce risk and receive increased resources and protection (befriend). As an example, during an attempted assault, neuroendocrine differences make it less likely that a female will adopt a physical fight response and more likely that she will engage in behaviors to simultaneously protect herself and her offspring; this means that female response to the threat is more likely to be "cerebral in nature." Hudson and McDermott maintain that this tend-and-befriend approach focuses on post-deterrence to "mitigate threat through de-escalation (befriend), and seek to bolster human security in situations of deterrence failure (tend)" and that a "blended deterrence stance of 'fight and befriend,' coupled with postdeterrence planning of 'tend and flight" offers clear advantages over simple, conventionally masculinist "fight or flight" strategies.

Hudson and McDermott argue that with "fight and befriend"-because as much effort is invested in befriending through diplomacy, economic development, and aid as fighting toward a longer-term goal-there is less chance of hostilities breaking out. They assert that "fight and befriend," coupled with strong "tend and flight" post-deterrence contingency planning, provides greater human security and undermines the success of the opposing party's aggression. These arguments resemble other scholarly findings that successful deterrence requires "broad-based strategies to dissuade," more than mere threats, a combination of threats with concessions, a mix of deterrence with conciliation. We argue that only a US deterrence approach using Hudson and McDermott's more feminine alternative will successfully deter a postrevolutionary, nuclear-capable Iran, as demonstrated by recent history.

The Bush Administration (2001-2009)

The George W. Bush administration initially sent mixed messages regarding its Iran strategy; offering to "re-set the clock” on official relations ("befriend") while urging Congress to reassess sanctions, as well as Iran's membership in the World Trade Organization ("tend"). Yet the administration emphasized Iran's dangerous power as a terrorist-producing state ("fight").

Immediately after the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Bush administration encouraged Iran, as a key regional actor, to join the US-led “War on Terror" ("befriend").

Iran, sensing a new international environment and an opportunity to rid itself of the troublesome Taliban, chose to “offer the US-led efforts some tangible support in the war against Afghanistan." Iranian officials publicly denounced the 9/11 events, offered assistance with the rescue of downed American pilots, and worked with the US State Department to stabilize Kabul and form an interim government. Backchannel talks between Iranian and US officials were held in Paris and Geneva regarding how to deal with al-Qaeda members fleeing from Afghanistan into Iran. The Iranian people held candlelight vigils in the streets of Teheran in sympathy with the United States. However, functioning in what feminist philosopher Bonnie Mann has characterized as a hyper-masculine post-9/11 environment and what historian and defense advisor Donette Murray deemed "a Manichean 'with us' or 'with the terrorists' ultimatum," the Bush administration ultimately adopted hardline unilateral stance with Iran. It focused almost entirely on the threat of sanctions or even military force ("fight") rather than offer any benefits or incentives.

In his January 2002 State of the Union Address to the American people, President Bush grouped Iran, with North Korea and Iraq, as an "axis of evil.. . arming to threaten the peace of the world and thus set the stage for USIranian relations for the rest of his terms. The Bush administration subsequently voiced support for the Iranian people who wanted domestic regime change, increased US naval presence in the Persian Gulf, dismissed a May 2003 Iranian proposal for comprehensive talks, denounced Iran's 2005 presidential election, refused to rule out military and nuclear options to ensure Iranian compliance, singled out Iran in its 2006 National Security Strategy, and designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a proliferator of "Weapons of Mass Destruction." US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral James Fallon was prematurely relieved of his command in 2008 for publicly challenging the hardline Bush administration's policy with Iran, after saying in a 2007 al Jazeera interview that "the constant drumbeat of war" with Iran was not useful and then supporting diplomacy and restraint in a 2008 Esquire interview.

The Obama Administration (2009–2017)

The Obama administration adopted a blended approach of incentives and disincentives to deter Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons ambitions. President Barack Obama emphasized rapprochement, attempted engagement, and offered to repair US-Iranian relations before applying more economic pressure. The Obama administration's emphasis on rapprochement and diplomacy with Iran was an extension of the president's campaign promise that he would focus on engagement. He repeatedly stressed the importance of discourse with the objective of exhausting diplomatic efforts before contemplating military options. Two concrete illustrations of President Obama's diplomatic befriending approach were the March 2009 video he recorded for the Iranian people to celebrate the Persian New Year and the invitation for Iran to participate in the International Conference on Afghanistan at the World Forum Convention Center in The Hague. While President Obama's dual-track strategy, combining diplomacy and sanctions, had both carrots and sticks, his strategy did not restrict contact with Tehran as a form of pressure on the Iranian regime in the way Bush's strategy had. Therefore, despite President Obama's emphasizing that all military options were still on the table-should Iran fail to abandon its nuclear ambitions via diplomatic means-a case can be made that in the beginning of President Obama's first term he pursued more of a feminine "tend and befriend" deterrence posture. Accordingly, the Obama administration adopted behaviors to reduce threats to its goals and interests ("tend") and tried to increase affiliations with the Iranian people themselves as well as other social groups to reduce risk ("befriend"). This approach, however, was short-lived.

As President Obama's first term progressed, he faced increased pressure from the US Congress, as well as the American people, to adopt tougher sanctions against Iran-particularly after news broke of the 2009 Iranian elections resulting in widespread protests that were violently repressed by the Iranian police. Ultimately, when the Iranians refused the diplomatically reached "fuel-swap proposal” (whereby Iran would ship out enriched uranium in return for a supply of fuel for nuclear research purposes), as well as the US offer to help Tehran purchase medical isotopes on the world market, the Obama administration was forced to drop the arguably "tend and befriend" approach and shift deterrence strategies to increase pressure and sanctions.

In June 2010, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1929, which "created multilateral initiatives to impose painful sanctions on Iran." Thereafter, President Obama was considered a progressive pragmatist who continued to turn up the pressure on Iran while even using diplomacy with China and Russia to secure support for increased Iranian sanctions. While the Obama administration's tactics shifted from direct diplomacy with Iran to increased diplomacy with members of the UN Security Council to strengthen the "international community's commitment to nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament," this strategy still appears to conform to Hudson and McDermott's "befriend" approach. In other words, the United States was seeking to affiliate with different social groups to increase resources at its disposal to deter Iran. Since the United States was threatening sanctions and therefore using deterrence by punishment strategies at the same time, it can be argued that the approach the Obama administration took was a blended masculine/feminine deterrence posture of "fight and befriend."

In June 2013, the election of the more moderate Iranian presidential candidate, Hassan Rouhani, changed the course of the nuclear negotiations. President Rouhani prioritized normalizing relations with the West and ending the sanctions against Iran. The Obama administration resumed direct diplomacy with Iran leading to Obama and Rouhani speaking directly during the first communication between the two country's leaders since 1979. Yet, while the Obama administration changed course back to befriending Iran, it did not stop its multilateral diplomacy enforcing increased sanctions on Iran. Nor did it stop hinting that military action, primarily air strikes, could be utilized to get an agreement. In fact, the United States maintained increased pressure on Iran throughout the entire time it worked diplomatically on Iran's point-bypoint acquiescence to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JСРОА), eventually signed in July 2015 by the United States, France, Germany, Russia, China, the European Union, and Iran.

Therefore, while President Rouhani's election marked a breakthrough in the nuclear discussions, ultimately the Obama administration's blended "fight and befriend" deterrence strategy arguably resulted in more direct diplomatic contact and warmer US-Iranian relations than previous approaches, as well as Iran agreeing to, signing, and complying with the JCPOA. The approach has been lauded by supporters as having created effective "coercive assurances in securing and maintaining Iranian compliance with nuclear constraints.' Recognizing the difficulty with after-the-fact compellence once nuclear weapons are acquired, the JCPOA kept Iranian nuclear efforts still within range of deterrence, if only through buying time for political circumstances in Iran to change. However, critics argued that the approach was too soft on Iran and ultimately resulted in US negotiators giving away too much in return for too little.

The Trump Administration (2017-2021)

The election of President Donald Trump marked the end of any befriending strategy previously employed to deter Iran. President Trump repeatedly criticized both the Obama administration's approach, as well as the resulting terms of the JСPOA.+7 President Trump's hawkish stance followed his multiple campaign promises that he would "force the Iranians back to the bargaining table to make a much better [nuclear] deal. On October 13, 2017, the Trump administration announced its decision not to recertify the Iran Nuclear Agreement Act (INARA), a domestic statute requiring the President to publicly certify Iran's compliance with the JCPOA. This action triggered a sixty-day window for Congress to consider reintroducing "snap-back" legislation imposing automatic nuclear sanctions on Iran. During this time, President Trump also launched a new strategy on Iran that aimed to neutralize Iran's "destabilizing influence" and constrain Iran's "aggression, particularly its support for terrorism and militants. Arguing that the "reckless behavior of the Iranian regime, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in particular, poses one of the most dangerous threats to the interests of the United States and to regional stability," the Trump administration's new Iran strategy focused both on deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment threats ("fight"). It mentioned, as an aside, that multilateral alliances ("befriending") might be used to condemn Iran's "gross violations of human rights" and bulwark "against Iranian subversion." Thus, while it could be argued that the Trump administration's approach did not preclude "befriending," it primarily consisted of deterrence strategies based on "fight" and threat.

Throughout the rest of its term, the Trump administration continued its primarily unilateral, masculinist "fight" approach to deter Iran. On May 8, 2018, the Trump administration officially withdrew the United States from the JCPOA and shortly thereafter announced the re-imposition of sanctions on Iran. European leaders and allies argued against and condemned the pullout, with British Prime Minister Theresa May, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Germen Chancellor Angela Merkel noting in a joint statement that "According to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], Iran continues to abide by the restrictions set out by the JCPOA, in line with the obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," inferring that the United States was withdrawing without substantive cause.

On August 6, 2018, President Trump signed an Executive Order entitled Reimposing Certain Sanctions with Respect to Iran to bolster his unilateral approach. Additionally, the Trump administration adopted numerous threatbased deterrence postures ("fight") against not only Iran, but US allies as well. For example, Congressional members from the Trump administration's party threatened the French, German, and British ambassadors to the United States.

In a letter, the party urged compliance with the re-imposed sanctions and warned that it would be "particularly troubling if you sought to evade or undermine American statutes." Doing so "could well prompt Congressional action." The United States imposed numerous unilateral sanctions and designations against Iranian individuals, companies, and banks. President Trump signaled that regime change would be best for the Iranian people while at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York. Militarily, the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and a bomber task force were deployed to "send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime," and additional US troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia after the Aramco attack. The United States designated the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. And perhaps most noted globally, the United States conducted the targeted 2020 airstrike assassination of Iranian Major General Qassim Soleimani.

Conversely, little to no diplomacy or multilateral efforts with Iran or with international allies were utilized by the Trump administration to deter Iran. Eventually, had the Trump administration's overly and overtly masculinist "maximum pressure" fight response been taken to its natural end, the strategy potentially would have put the United States in a compromised situation. It might have required the United States to engage in military action, most likely unilateral and without support of its European allies. The United States might have adopted a "flight" response by walking away from previous threats and not taking military action after failing to deter a nuclear Iran.

The Trump administration's approach resulted in escalated tension in the Persian Gulf, with analyst Daniel Byman asserting in January 2020 that "Trump's reckless Middle East policy has brought the US to the brink of war.

That same month, Iran's Revolutionary Guards shot down a Ukrainian passenger plane as it took off from Tehran's airport, killing all 176 people on board. The Iranian government later declared the shoot-down a “disastrous mistake by forces who were on high alert during a regional confrontation with the United States. The incident occurred after months of dangerous tit-fortat escalation with the United States that left US-Iranian relations in shambles, the United States with reduced global credibility after abandoning its treaty obligations, Iranian leadership refusing further direct negotiations with US officials, and hardline conservative Iranians vindicating themselves with the Iranian people.

In 2019, Iran declared that it would no longer be bound by stockpiles limitations on enriched uranium and heavy-water reserves. Additionally, Iran started producing uranium metal enriched up to 20 percent, accelerated its enrichment of 60 percent uranium-235, started construction and improvements on more nuclear facilities, and unreservedly began increased ballistic missile testing. At the same time, Iran's Guardian Council approved legislation mandating the Iranian government to increase enrichment levels and suspend UN inspections of nuclear sites. JCPOA supporters argue that President Trump's all-"fight" approach encouraged and provided justification for Iran to move forward with its nuclear program, while hardliners maintain that Iran never intended to live up to the terms of what they, the hardliners, considered a weak agreement.

The Biden Administration: A Chance for a New Approach

President Joe Biden's first official foreign policy speech promised that "Diplomacy is back" as the center of US foreign policy. The United States, he promised, will "repair alliances and engage with the world once again."

However, despite diplomatic thetoric and campaign promises to engage with Iran and possibly return the United States to the JCPOA, the Biden administration initially adopted a threatening stance, stating that only Iran's strict return to full JCPOA compliance would restart nuclear discussions or sanctions relief and that the United States was not yet ready to directly engage with Iran. It therefore can be argued that initially the Biden administration adopted a full "fight" approach. By mid-February 2021, the administration slightly softened its position and signaled that the United States would accept an invitation from the EU to discuss reviving the nuclear deal. The administration also sent a letter to the UN Security Council formally rescinding the Trump administration's request to restore sanctions on Iran and lifted restrictions on the movement of Iranian diplomats.65 However, at the same time, the administration renewed airstrikes in Syria on Iranian proxies and continued to refuse to engage directly with Iran itself or take the first step toward reentering the JСРОА.

By April 2021, Iran and the United States were engaged in indirect talks in Vienna. By October, the Biden administration was openly working with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom and calling upon other nations to encourage Iran to return to full JCPOA compliance. Overall, the Biden administration has appeared to be constructing an approach to both deter Iran's nuclear ambitions and bring some measure of bipartisanship to deeply divided Washington politics, by making concessions on sanctions to Iran while maintaining and increasing pressure on Iran's proxies. Consistently, however, Washington hardliners object to anything deemed concessionary, as expected of those who know and accept only the "fight or flight" approach. So, while it can be argued that President Biden has been adopting a "fight and befriend" approach, a better strategy would be for the administration to increase its befriending, reduce its fighting, and adopt a proactive "tend and flight" postdeterrence policy. This is recommended particularly since it is very likely that the Iranians have accumulated irreversible knowledge regarding producing uranium metal and advanced centrifuge operations and their efficiency.

Deterrence for the Future

Effective deterrence strategies will be increasingly difficult in the future. Developing effective strategies requires remembering the basic tenets of deterrence, including perception. Deterrence scholar Robert Jervis wrote in 1983, "Unless statesman understand the ways in which their opposite numbers see the world, their deterrence policies are likely to misfire." In the case of Iran, perceptions of the United States are unfavorable and distrustful. Consequently, a "befriend and fight" stance begins to repair those perceptions and thereby offers an alternative deterrence approach to better suit US-Iranian relations.

In 2021, 85 percent of the Iranian public viewed the United States unfavorably and 76 percent viewed the United States "very unfavorably." Like much of the world, Iran is still suffering from the hangover left by four years of transactional, hyper-masculine politics characteristic of the Trump administration. It is hesitant to view changes in US policy as real and lasting. Subsequently, two thirds of Iranians believe the Biden administration is hostile and 73 percent of Iranians believe the United States is seeking to prevent humanitarian-related products from reaching their country.

Given that two thirds of Iranians believe the United States is untrustworthy to meet its commitments made toward Iran and only 48 percent approve of Iran reentering the JCPOA, 7 the Biden administration should generate Iranian goodwill through befriending strategies if it is serious about increasing diplomacy.

The Iranian people themselves indicate that a little US goodwill would go a long way; 83 percent think it would be a "very meaningful" gesture if the United States were to lift the sanctions that the Trump administration imposed on Iran's central bank. And 76 percent of Iranians believe an official condemnation of the assassinations of Iranian scientists as violations of international law would be a meaningful symbolic step. Other examples of what the administration could do to adopt a "befriend and fight" position would be to drop the sanctions that the UN Special Rapporteur says harmed Iran's COVID relief, particularly as the Omicron variant and its subvariant continues to spread worldwide. The United States could also encourage allies who are manufacturing COVID vaccines and medications outside of the United States to export doses to Iran. Additionally, the administration can offer Iran aid and assistance for Afghan refugees fleeing the Taliban and work with Iran and the World Food Programme to deliver food and aid to Afghans near the Iranian border.

During a period of increased "befriending," the Biden administration should continue both unilateral and diplomatic efforts and sanctions to maintain international pressure on Iran to deter its regional aggressive behavior and further violations of the JCPOA (“fight"). However, the administration must understand that 89 percent of Iranians believe developing Iran's missile program is important and 62 percent of Iranians believe developing its missile program deters future attacks against Iran. Additionally, more than 70 percent of Iranians believe it is important for Iran to continue developing its nuclear program. And if the JCPOA falls through and the Raisi administration decides to continue to expand Iran's nuclear program, 64 percent believe Iran's economy will get better or stay the same and 57 percent believe Iran's 75 international trade will get better or stay the same.

Given that Iran's breakout time has likely been reduced significantly and because the effectiveness of any deterrence by punishment strategy revolves most importantly around the subjective perceptions of Iran, it is critical that the Biden administration also develop an effective post-deterrence strategy. A return to the JCPOA might be impossible, and the Raisi administration is unlikely to agree to temper Iran's missile program due to Iranian popular opinion and coalition politics. Iran is a theocratic democracy, even though the United States frames it as an authoritarian theocracy. Any "tend and flight" post-deterrence policy must clarify what specific US vital interests are negatively impacted by Iran having nuclear capabilities to address those interests first and to ensure new red lines are drawn-while, at a minimum, significantly increasing and guaranteeing IAEA inspector access and ensuring vigilant monitoring. Additionally, a "tend and flight" deterrence policy must plan for and take steps to mitigate regional nuclear proliferation and deescalate regional tensionsparticularly with Saudi Arabia and Israel.

In sum, the United States' most recent presidential administrations have arguably implemented both purely masculine and mixed masculine/feminine approaches to deter Iran; however, only the mixed masculine/feminine approach ultimately achieved its goals. Post JCPOA, the Biden administration confronts a more difficult situation: attempting to deter a more confident and capable Iran. This is particularly the case because previous overly masculine US strategies destroyed US-Iranian relations and undermined US reputation, and consequently its strategic influence. It is critical that President Biden course correct, adopt a “befriend and fight" deterrence policy, and plan a "tend and flight" post-deterrence contingency policy.

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